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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary Judgment could not issue as a matter of fact or law. The recent holding
in Bangeter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009) is dispositive of the issues raised on appeal in
this case. No statute of limitations barred Strand from asserting his defenses or his
Counterclaim to Quiet Title in the Property because he was in actual possession of the
Property under a claim of ownership. Golden Meadows argument on Strands trust claims
confuses legal ownership with beneficial ownership. The Trust Agreement is evidenced
by a writing and by the parties performance of their obligations for 25 years. Strand was
prejudiced by not being allowed the time and opportunity to discover and present
evidence relevant to his defenses and Counterclaim to Quiet Title which were properly
before the Court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS BARRED STRAND, IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE
REAL PROPERTY UNDER A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP, FROM
ASSERTING A QUIET TITLE ACTION AND LITIGATING HIS
DEFENSES
Since the filing of the briefs in this matter, the Utah Supreme Court has had

occasion to rule on the very issues which are presented in this case ie: whether a person
in possession of a premises may be time barred under various statutes of limitations from
raising the very claims which were considered time barred by the lower court in this case.
See Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009) [Addendum at 1]. That case came after the
filing of the briefs and has not been cited in any brief yet the holding in that case is
l

dispositive of the issues raised on appeal in this case. Appellants move this Court to
summarily reverse the lower court's ruling. The Trial Coikrt improperly relied upon the
statute of limitations in granting Golden Meadows Motion for Summary Judgment. Had
the Judge thought that the statutes of limitations had not njm it would have also affected
his decisions on other aspects of this case.
A.

Strands claim of ownership under Utah Code §78 Chapter 40 and color of title
§57 Chapter 6 were properly pleaded and raised f>elow [R. 44-46, 13, 71]. Golden
Meadows had notice and responded [R. 94,132,134]. Strand was denied the right
to establish his affirmative defenses and the elements of his counterclaim [R. 71,
168,4299,1164,1319,1771,1886,1888, 1911,|1933,2002,2005, 2213,4300]

Express Trust
It is undisputed between the parties that Strand purchased the property in 1976
and possessed it ever since and that the basic claim under the Express Trust is that
Neuman Petty ("Petty") held legal ownership of the property in trust for Michael Strand
"Strand" pursuant to the 1982 Agreement and the parses oral understanding ("Trust
Agreement")
Strand allowed Petty to obtain title through th^ Citizen's Bank foreclosure
pursuant to the terms of that Trust Agreement1.

1

[R. 2075-2076ff s 14-16 and f 18, 1775 f f s 17-19, Stbnds Depo. at 103 lines 24-25
[R. 626], 106 lines 8-25 [R. 627], 108 lines 12-25 [R. 628], 109 lines 1-2 [R. 629], 120
lines 13-15 [R. 630], 122 lines 1-25 [R. 632],123 lines l\l5 [R. 633], 124 lines 1-4 [R.
634], 126 lines 8-25 [R. 636], 127 lines 1-25 [R. 637], 128 lines 1-25 [R. 638] and, 129
lines 1-25 [R. 639]. [R 2075 Tf9, Strands Depo. R. 2192 pi. 476 lines 16-25, and 2193 pg.
477 lines 1-25]. [R. 2187 - 2194 Strands Depo at 476 lines ?l-25 and 477 lines 1-25].
2

The fundamental agreement was fulfilled and performed by Petty. [Strand Depo.
R. 628 lines 19-25,629 lines 1-2]
Petty allowed Strand to live in the house for 25 years as performance of his
obligation under the parties agreement. [R. 45f20, 95^|8]
In 2000 Petty manipulated the legal ownership of the property between companies
that he owned and controlled but those acts did not defeat the purpose or enforcement of
the underlying trust agreement. [R. 45f20, 95f 8]
The Log Furniture transaction was a sham transaction. Petty sold the property to
Log Furniture for the stated purpose of augmenting the return of the Property to Strand's
name [R. 43^10, 5 If8] and with the understanding that Log Furniture would never make
any payments and would not pay the property taxes and would in effect simply hold it for
the benefit of Strand and Petty2. [R. 1777-1778 f f s 27- 28, 1754-1755ff s 4-19]
Petty returned legal ownership of the property to himself through the foreclosures
of the Log Furniture trust deed by Golden Meadows which is a company that Petty
through his alter ego Nupetco owns, manages and controls. Petty's son, attorney Ralph
Petty acted as the trustee. [R. 1855-1858, 1859, 996 f 15 (last line)]
The Court will recall that Nupetco Associates "Nupetco" was the first entity that
Petty used to hold legal title of the property.

2

As part of this transaction, Petty also caused Allen to sign a personal guarantee and took
ownership of 100% of the issued and outstanding stock of Log Furniture [R 687-690,
736-737]
3

After the foreclosures, Petty, acting through Nupetco and Golden Meadows
continued to perform his obligations under the Trust Agreement and continued to allow
Strand to remain in the possession of the premises for another three and a half years. [R.
45120, 95!8].
Strand and Petty's continuing performance of thdir obligations under the Trust
Agreement for a quarter of a century supersedes the requirement that the agreement be
written. [R. 45120, 95f8].
The evidence shows that notwithstanding Strand's 1989 deposition testimony
Strand and Petty's conduct over this 25 year period established that the Trust Agreement
was constantly in force. [R. 45^20, 95^8].
It is undisputed between the parties that Strand maintained possession of this
property for over 25 years without the payment of any rent. In fact Golden Meadows
argues at page 25 (second paragraph) that Strands clain^ of adverse possession cannot
stand because the possession could not be adverse. In othej- words Petty allowed Strand to
retain possession pursuant to the terms of the parties Trust Agreement.
The basic claim is that Strand and Petty entered intb a trust agreement. Under the
Petty would hold the property in trust for Strand . Under that agreement Petty through the
entities that he owned and controlled agreed to protect Strand's home for the benefit of
Strand. The parties performed that agreement without interruption for 25 years. [R. 630
(Depo at 120, lines 13-18), 45f20, 9518].

The Agreement is evidenced by a writing [R. 603, 652] and by Petty and Strand's
performance of their obligations under the agreement for a 25 year period [45^[20,95^|8].
Petty controlled the legal title throughout this period of time and Strand retained
possession of the property pursuant to the parties Trust Agreement [R. 45f20, 95f8].
Therefore Golden Meadows arguments on those issues are not persuasive.
The Judge struck affidavits or portions thereof and evidence submitted by the
Appellants on the mistaken belief that the statute of limitations prevented Strand from
litigating these issues [R. 2213].
The new decision of the Supreme Court in Bangerter v. Petty declares that these
issues were properly before the Court and that evidence should have been considered.
Therefore the Trial Court committed reversible error when it denied the Appellants
discovery motions and when it struck the affidavit testimony and other evidence that
created a disputed issue of material fact concerning the 1982 Agreement, the express trust
and the parties performance.
The Trial Court confused the concepts of legal ownership and beneficial
ownership. Strand's 1989 deposition testimony that he did not own the house in 1989
does not contradict Strand's current claim that he has the beneficial right to continued
possession of his home of 32 years. The Court continues confused the beneficial right
to possession with legal ownership. It is clear that under the parties agreement as

5

articulated by Strand3, Petty or companies under Petty's control would be the "Owners"
of the property and Strand would hold a beneficial right to continual possession. Thus
Strand's 1989 statement that he did not own the property does not defeat his claims as a
beneficiary of the trust agreement and his right to possession of the property and does not
evidence any bad faith on his part.
Under the terms of the parties trust agreement Petty was to hold legal ownership
to the property for the benefit of Strand and Strand was to retain possession of the
property. Petty fulfilled his obligations under that agreement for 25 years.
Constructive Trust
Golden Meadows attempts to argue that any constructive trust claim by Strand
was barred by Statute of Limitations. In support of thib argument Golden Meadows
claims that analysis as to when the statute began to run in this case is complicated by the
inadequacy of the Counterclaim itself, including its failure to distinguish between
Nupetco and Golden Meadows. Golden Meadows states that nowhere did the
Counterclaim expressly allege a wrongful act or unjust enrichment and that there were
only two possible candidates for the 'Svrongful act" ie: Nupetco's 1985 acquisition of the
home from the Citizen's Bank or the 2000 Log Furniture! transaction and that neither of
which could have been an act of Golden Meadows.

[ Appellants Admissions R. 659-670, Strands Deposition!testimony (referred to in
footnote 3) and Appellants Answer and Counterclaim R. $9]

In their Counterclaim, the Appellants alleged that: (i) Strand had allowed his
home to be titled in the name of Golden Meadows and its predecessor in interest to hold
for Strand's benefit use and advantage. [R. 45 fl9], (ii) that Golden Meadows was
placed as a fiduciary over the property [R. 46 f30], (iii) at the time that Strand agreed
that title could be placed in the name of Golden Meadows, both parties understood, knew,
acknowledged and affirmed that the property was being placed in Golden Meadows
name, in trust, with the complete and clear knowledge and understanding that Golden
Meadows was acting as trustee [R. 47 f34] and, (iv) that at the time that the instant
lawsuit was filed, Golden Meadows immediately breached its fiduciary duty by
attempting to deprive Strand of the value of hundreds of thousands of dollars of which
the property is worth and to dispossess him of the habitation and rest in such property.
[R.46131]. {See Appellants Opening Brief at pages 26-29).
The new decision of the Supreme Court is dispositive of the issue and declares
that Strand's constructive trust claims were properly before the Court and should have
been considered. See Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009). Therefore the Trial Court
committed reversible error when it adopted Golden Meadows theory that Strand's
constructive trust claim was barred by the statute of limitations and struck the affidavit
testimony and other evidence that created a disputed issue of material fact.
Scheduling Order
Due process requires Strand an opportunity to prosecute his Quiet Title Action.
Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009). Title to the land is not involved in the unlawful
7

detainer action. Welling v. Abbott, 52 Utah 240, 173 P. 245 (1918). The Court committed
reversible error when it imposed the time limitations of the unlawful detainer statute on
Strand's prosecution of his Counterclaim to Quiet Title and Strand was prejudiced [R.
4299,168943009191192702].
Discovery
Due process requires the Appellants an opportunity to discover and present
evidence relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. The Trial Court
erred when it denied the Appellants the right to obtain and present that evidence. The new
decision in Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009) declares that Strand was entitled to
discover information relating to his defenses and his Counterclaim to Quiet Title.
I

The Trial Court erred when it precluded the Appellants from discovering
information about the Notice to Quit, the 1985 Citizen's Bank foreclosure sale and the
1985 lease that Golden Meadows used in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment
[R. 975, 654-657, 970^|6]. The evidence that the Appellants were not allowed to discover
and present would show that Judge Dawson was the prosecuting attorney in an IRS
action brought against Strand in 19894 that involved

the

exact same property,

individuals ie: Petty and Strand, and evidence (the 1985 lease). Based on that evidence
the Judge should have recused himself or been removed from the case pursuant to Utah
Cannons of Judicial Conduct Cannon 3(E)(1)(a) and (b). The Judge committed reversible
error when he denied the Appellants the right to obtain #nd present that evidence and
4

4 years after the Citizen's Bank foreclosure
8

took an inconsistent position in this case that contradicted the position he took in 1989.
See Appellants Opening Brief at pg. 23-24 at B.
Appellee's Addendum at 13 and 14
Strand's affidavit in Support of the Rule 63 and 60(b) Motions declaring under
oath that Judge Dawson represented the Internal Revenue Service against him in 1989
and gained knowledge through his involvement of the house and furniture, the lease and
Strand's business and personal and confidential relationship with Petty is supported by
the ancient documents [R. 2963 ] and remains uncontradicted by admissible evidence as
neither Golden Meadows, Petty or Judge Dawson have filed rebuttal affidavits. The
same is true with respect to Strand's Affidavit testimony that Wayne Petty did represent
him in the Citizen's Bank Federal litigation [R. 2966 %%]. This Court cannot accept
Golden Meadows assertions over Strand's affidavit testimony.
The appeal from the Orders denying the Appellants Rule 63 and 60(b) Motions
along with Golden Meadows Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions5 are before this Court
designated as Case #20090012-CA and #20090867-CA. The Appellants Brief in case
#20090012-CA was filed on September 28, 2009. The Appellants Docketing Statement
in case # 20090876-CA and Errata were filed on November 9, 2009 and November 10.
2009 respectively.

5

Attached to Golden Meadows Brief at Addendum
9

Summary Judgment Affidavits
The Trial Court erred by excluding testimony that was submitted by the
Appellants in opposition to Golden Meadows Motion ftbr Summary Judgment and in
support of Strands claim to quiet title on the mistaken belief that the statute of limitations
barred Strand's quiet title action and prevented Strand and Allen from disputing contested
issues of material fact. The stricken testimony was an 0ffer of proof as to what the
relevant facts are. The new decision of the Supreme Cotirt declares that the Affidavit
testimony concerning Strand's claims and the Appellants defenses were properly before
the Court and that the evidence should have been considered. Therefore the Trial Court
committed reversible error when it struck the affidavit testimony and other evidence that
created a disputed issue of material fact. [R. 2213]
II.

CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF

a.)

Pg. 14. Golden Meadows attempts to argu0 that the fact that the July 21

2000 Real Estate Contract between Nupetco and Log Furniture did not indicate that
financing would be involved became irrelevant since it merged at closing into the Deed
and Trust Deed. In support of this argument, Golden Meadows cites Panos v. Olsen and
Associates Const Inc., 2005 UT App 446, f l l , 123 P. 3d!816. That "Under the merger
doctrine, a deed is the final integrated agreement of the parties and abrogates all prior
agreements, whether written or oral."
Despite that argument, Panos v. Olsen 2005 UT App 446, 114, 123 P. 3d 816
states: "Under Utah law, the "merger doctrine" has four discrete exceptions (1) mutual
10

mistake in the drafting of the final documents; (2) ambiguity in the final documents; (3)
existence of rights collateral to the contract of sale; and (4)fraudin the transaction."
The Appellants contend that two exceptions apply: (1) existence of rights
collateral to the contract of sale and (2) fraud in the transaction. These exceptions were
presented by the Appellants in their Opening Brief at pages 9-15 "C" and 37-41 at "2".
b.)

In Support of the Rule 59 Motion, Strand filed a check to Nupetco and

Moyle & Draper for the payment of Wayne Petty's legal fees and

attorney Dan

Jackson's billing statements- that Wayne Petty did represent him in aspect of the 1982
Agreement [Appellants Opening Brief Addendum at 2]. Golden Meadows response at
page 10 (last paragraph) does not satisfy their burden of rebutting the Appellants' brief on
this matter. Neither Neuman Petty (the manager of Nupetco the owner and manager of
Golden Meadows and Golden Meadows agent in this case) nor his son, attorney Wayne
Petty (a co-manager and legal counsel to Nupetco and Golden Meadows agent and now
co-counsel in this case) have denied the authenticity of these documents.
c.) Page 12 <|8. The foreclosure of the Log Furniture Trust Deed was held by
Ralph Petty for the benefit of Strand [R. 1843 f21, 1778 f29, 1756 f 18 ]. The $2,000
check to Ralph Petty Esq. on November 20, 2003 the day after he filed the Trustee's
Deed states that payment to him is in the form of a "Loan to Strand" [R. 1859]. Neither
Neuman Petty who signed the check nor his son attorney Ralph Petty (a member of
Nueptco and legal counsel to Nupetco and Golden Meadows) have refuted the
Appellants' testimony or denied the check's authenticity.
11

CONCLUSION
The recent holding in Bangeter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009). is dispositive of the
issues raised on appeal in this case. No statute of limitations barred Strand from asserting
his defenses or his Counterclaim to quiet title in the Property because he was in actual
possession of the Property under a claim of ownership for 25 years. At no time did Petty
ever state to Strand that Strand did not have an unconditional right to stay in the
possession of the property until August 2007 when he was served the Notice to Quit [R.
4]. Even if Strand knew of a potential claim, there was no reason to put him to the
expense and inconvenience of litigation until such a claim was pressed against him.
Bangerter v. Petty at f 16. Summary Judgment could not issue in this case as a matter of
fact or law. Accordingly this Court should reverse the trial court's rulings.
I

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jjg_ day of November, 2009.

Michael Strand

Cari Allen
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ADDENDUM

Bangeter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009)

1

Utah Code §78 Chapter 40

„

2

Utah Code §57 Chapter 6

,

3

2 0 0 9 UT 6 7

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
Sonia Capri Bangerter,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,

No. 20080562

v.
Ralph Petty, an individual;
Jarmaccc Properties, LLC,
a Utah limited liability company;
Jarmaccc, Inc., a Utah corporation;
and John Does 1 through 10,
individuals and entities whose true
names are unknown, and who may
claim some right, title, estate,
lien, or interest in real property
owned by plaintiff,
Defendants and Respondents.

F I L E D
October 20, 2009

Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Mark S. Kouris
No. 040900081
Attorneys:

James C. Haskins, Ryan M. James, Salt Lake City, for
petitioner
Ralph C. Petty, Salt Lake City, for respondents

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
PARRISH, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
1|l
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether
the court of appeals erred in concluding that Jarmaccc
Properties, LLC (Jarmaccc) did not waive its statute of
limitations defense. Because we hold that the statute of
limitations does not bar an individual, in actual possession of
real property under a claim of ownership, from asserting a quiet
title action, we need not address whether Jarmaccc waived its
statute of limitations defense. We therefore remand this case to

the court of appeals to consider whether the district court erred
in deciding Jarmaccc's remaining claims.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
f2
Sonya Capri Bangerter has continuously occupied the
real property (the Property) disputed in this case since she
purchased it in April 1994. She has paid all the real estate
taxes on the Property from 1994 to the present,1 and she is the
only individual or entity that has made mortgage payments on the
Property.
f3
In April 1995, a judgment was entered against Bangerter
in the amount of $307.46 for failure to pay for dental services,2
which ultimately resulted in a writ of execution that commanded
the sheriff "to collect the judgment, with costs, interest, and
fees, and to sell enough of defendant's non-exempt real property
to satisfy the same." A deputy sheriff filed a notice of real
estate levy against the Property and it was subsequently sold in
March 1996 at a public auction for $1,550.00 to North American
Recovery Services (N.A.R.), a collection agency. Bangerter
failed to redeem the property within six months, and as a result
N.A.R. was given a sheriff's deed to the Property in September
1996. More than a year later, an amended real estate certificate
of sale execution was filed to correct an error in the legal
description of the property that was present in the original
notice of real estate levy and certificate of sale execution.
N.A.R. subsequently filed a quitclaim deed to the Property in
favor of Jarmaccc.
1(4
Bangerter alleges she never received any notice that
the Property would be sold at a public auction to satisfy the
judgment for the unpaid dental services. Indeed, Bangerter
asserts that she was unaware that Jarmaccc or anyone else claimed
an adverse interest in the Property until March 1998. Even then,
Bangerter claims that she was ignorant of Jarmaccc's adverse
claim of actual title. Rather, she believed that Jarmaccc held
only a lien on the Property.
%5
In March 1998, Bangerter filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy. Shortly after Bangerter filed, Jarmaccc served

1

Jarmaccc attempted to pay the real estate taxes on the
Property for 2001, but its payment was rejected and refunded;
Bangerter's payment was accepted.
2

The original amount of Bangerter's unpaid dental bill was
$67.52.
No. 20080562

2

Bangerter with the first and only Notice to Quit the Property.
However, Jarmaccc did not pursue the Notice to Quit,3 nor did it
file a motion seeking relief from the automatic stay provisions
of the bankruptcy code. After Bangerter's first bankruptcy was
dismissed, Bangerter filed for bankruptcy a second time.4 In
Bangerter's second bankruptcy action, she listed Jarmaccc as a
secured creditor with a lien on the Property for $1,2 00.00.
Bangerter's bankruptcy plan provided that "[a]ny lien or other
claim against the title of debtor's real property securing the
claim of Jarmaccc Properties shall be extinguished and released
by payment through the Plan." Jarmaccc received a copy of
Bangerter's bankruptcy plan and failed to lodge any objections.
Bangerter then paid Jarmaccc the full amount set out in the
bankruptcy plan.5 In August 2 003, after Jarmaccc had received
full payment under the terms of the bankruptcy plan, the
bankruptcy court dismissed Bangerter's second bankruptcy
petition.
f6
In January 2004, Bangerter filed this action against
Jarmaccc seeking to quiet title to the Property. Bangerter
argued that title to the Property should be quieted in her
because the sheriff's deed was void and Jarmaccc was equitably
estopped from claiming any title to the property where it failed
to object to Bangerter's second bankruptcy plan that listed
Jarmaccc as a secured creditor and where Bangerter had paid
Jarmaccc the full amount set out in that plan. In its answer,
Jarmaccc asserted that the statute of limitations barred
Bangerter's quiet title action, that Jarmaccc held title to the
Property, and that the bankruptcy proceeding could not convey
title back to Bangerter.

3

Jarmaccc argues that it did not pursue the Notice to Quit
because of the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code.
However, Jarmaccc could have filed for relief from the automatic
stay provisions during the pending bankruptcy proceeding but
chose not to do so.
4

Indeed, Jarmaccc did not file a motion seeking relief from
the automatic stay provisions during either of Bangerter's
bankruptcy proceedings.
5

Jarmaccc did not attempt to reject the funds it received
from Bangerter's second bankruptcy proceeding at the time the
funds were paid and made no attempt to tender those funds back to
Bangerter until exactly one week before it filed its brief before
the court of appeals.
3

No. 20080562

1(7 After both parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment, the district court quieted title in Bangerter holding
that (1) the original sale of the Property failed to convey any
title because the deed contained an incorrect legal description,
(2) Jarmaccc failed to object to the bankruptcy plan, and (3)
Bangerter would be injured if Jarmaccc was "allowed to contradict
its actions in accepting the payments made pursuant to the
Chapter 13 plan." The district court also rejected Jarmaccc's
statute of limitations arguments.
1(8 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district
court and held that Jarmaccc did not waive its statute of
limitations defense and that, pursuant to Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In
re Hoopiiaina Trust), 2006 UT 53, 144 P.3d 1129, the statute of
limitations bars Bangerter's quiet title action against Jarmaccc.
Bangerter v. Petty, 2008 UT App 153, UK 15-24, 184 P.3d 1249.
Because the court of appeals held that Bangerter's quiet title
action was barred by the statute of limitations, it did not
consider whether the district court erred in its determination
that Jarmaccc's deed was defective because of an incorrect legal
description or whether Jarmaccc was equitably estopped from
claiming title to the Property.
t9
Bangerter petitioned for certiorari, which we granted.
We have jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code section
78A-3-102(3) (a) (2008) .
STANDARD OF REVIEW
^[10 "On certiorari review, we review the decision of the
court of appeals, not the decision of the district court." Nolan
v. Hoopiiaina (In re Hoopiiaina Trust), 2006 UT 53, % 19, 144
P.3d 1129. We review "the court of appeals' decision for
correctness, with particular attention to whether [it] reviewed
the [district] court's decision under the correct standard."
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 11, 164 P.3d 397. Summary
judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
"Therefore, when an appellate court reviews a
district court's grant of summary judgment,
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom [are viewed] in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, while the
district court's legal conclusions and
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment
are reviewed for correctness." Massev v.
Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, K 8, 152 P.3d 312

No. 20080562

4

(alteration in original) (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
Ull We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether
the court of appeals erred in holding that Jarmaccc did not waive
its statute of limitations defense when it failed to identify the
limitations statute it relied upon in its original Answer to
Bangerter's complaint.6 Because we hold that the statute of
limitations does not apply to quiet title actions where the
claimant is in actual possession of the property in question
under a claim of ownership, we need not address whether the court
of appeals erred in holding that Jarmaccc did not waive its
statute of limitations defense.7
I. A STATUTE OF LIMITATION NEVER BARS A PARTY FROM BRINING A
QUIET TITLE ACTION WHEN THAT PARTY IS IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE
REAL PROPERTY AT ISSUE UNDER A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP
Ul2 In Branting v. Salt Lake City, we established the
general rule that where "the action is purely one to remove a

6

JARMACCCs Answer to Bangerter's complaint alleges that
her claim was barred under the statute of limitations. Rule 9(h)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows:
In pleading the statute of limitations it is
not necessary to state the facts showing the
defense but it may be alleged generally that
the cause of action is barred by the
provisions of the statute relied <pn,
referring to or describing such statute
specifically and definitely by section
number, subsection designation, if anyf or
otherwise designating the provision relied
upon sufficiently clearly to identify it.
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(h) (emphasis added).
7

"We note that the scope of our grant of certiorari, while
generally binding on the parties for purposes of argument, does
not preclude us from treating dispositive issues that become
apparent when the advocacy process is complete." Massev v.
Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, H 9 n.l, 152 P.3d 312. The applicability
of the statute of limitations defense was ruled on by the court
of appeals. The interest of preventing the perpetuation of an
incorrect rule, we may correct errors in the court of appeals'
opinion on certiorari even when the parties initially fail to
bring the error to our attention.
5
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cloud or to quiet the title [to real property] , the statute of
limitations has no application." 153 P. 995, 1001 (Utah 1915).
However, in Branting we also held that "all actions in which the
principal purpose is to obtain some affirmative relief . . .
clearly come within the [statute of limitations]." Id. More
recently, in Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In re Hoopiiaina Trust), we
attempted to "clarify the rule regarding the application of the
statute of limitations to a quiet title action." 2006 UT 53,
H 21, 144 P.3d 1129. In that case, we held that "a court must
examine the relief sought in order to determine whether the
statute of limitations applies." Id. H 27. If the action is a
true quiet title action, meaning an action merely to "quiet an
existing title against an adverse or hostile claim of another,"
then the statute of limitations will not bar the claim. Id. H 26
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
However, " [i] f the party's claim for quiet title relief can be
granted only if the party succeeds on another claim, then the
statute of limitations applicable to the other claim will also
apply to the quiet title claim." Id. U 27.
^13 Relying on our analysis in In re Hoopiiaina Trust,
Jarmaccc argues that Bangerter's claim is not a true quiet title
action because Bangerter must first succeed on her claim to void
the sheriff's deed before she can have title quieted in her, and
therefore the statute of limitations bars Bangerter's claim to
the Property. Bangerter, on the other hand, argues that In re
Hoopiiaina Trust is distinguishable from this case on the basis
that it did not involve a quiet title action where the claimant
was in actual possession of the property. Bangerter cites the
court of appeals decision in Conder v. Hunt for the proposition
that "those in actual possession of real estate are never barred
by any statute of limitation from seeking to quiet their title."
2000 UT App 105, % 17, 1 P.3d 558.
^[14 The court of appeals attempted to reconcile In re
Hoopiiaina Trust with Conder by reasoning that the two cases were
not in conflict but that both rules must be satisfied to avoid
the statute of limitations. It reasoned that "[a] person in
possession who seeks to quiet their own title is not barred by
any statute of limitations." Bangerter v. Petty, 2008 UT App
153, f 23, 184 P.3d 1249. The court of appeals then held that
"Bangerter is not pursuing a 'true' quiet title action because
she did not have the title to the Property at the time she was in
possession of the Property and brought her lawsuit" and therefore
the statute of limitations applied and bared her quiet title
action. Id. We disagree. In re Hoopiiaina Trust does not apply
to bar an individual or entity in actual possession of property
under a claim of ownership from bringing an action to quiet
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title. As discussed below, this rule conforms to our prior case
law and mirrors the rule adopted by other jurisdictions.8
Kl5 While we have dealt with the applicability of the
statute of limitations in prior quiet title actions, this case
presents us with the first opportunity to address whether a
statute of limitations defense can prevent a claimant in actual
possession of the property at issue from bringing a quiet title
action.9 In Conder, the court of appeals recognized in dicta
that "the general rule is that those in actual possession of real
estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from seeking

8

See Clary v. Stack Steel & Supply Co., 611 P.2d 80, 83
(Alaska 1980)("Normally no statute of limitations applies to a
quiet title action brought by a person in possession of real
property . . . . " ) ; Tench v. Galaxy Appliance & Furniture Sales,
Inc., 567 S.E.2d 53, 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)("[T]here exists no
statute of limitation for the recovery of an equitable interest
in land. . . . xOne who is in possession of property under a
claim of ownership will not be guilty of laches for delay in
resorting to a court of equity to establish his rights.'"
(quoting Davis v. Newton, 108 S.E.2d 809, 811 (Ga. 1959)); Argyle
v. Slemaker, 585 P.2d 954, 958 (Idaho 1978)("Statutes of
limitation are generally held to be inapplicable in actions
brought by a landowner in possession seeking to quiet title
. . . . " ) ; Withroder v. Wiederoder, 134 P.2d 381, 385 (Kan.
1943)("Plaintiff was in possession, consequently he was entitled
to bring an action to quiet title at any time his convenience or
necessity might require."); Peterson v. Hopkins, 684 P.2d 1061,
1065 (Mont. 1984)("[T]he right of a plaintiff to have his title
to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse
claim, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain
in actual possession of the land, claiming to be the owners.");
Ford v. Clendenin, 109 N.E. 124, 126 (N.Y. 1915)("[A]n owner in
possession has a right to invoke the aid of a court of equity at
any time while he is so the owner and in possession-ft- . . . and
such a right is never barred by the Statute of Limitations.").
See also 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quieting Title and Determination of
Adverse Claims § 51 (2008)("Generally, the right of a plaintiff
to have his or her title to land quieted . . . is not barred
while the plaintiff or his or her grantors ijemain in possession
of the land, claiming to be its owners.").
9

Because the claimants in In re Hoopiiftina were not in
actual possession of the disputed property, our analysis in that
case does not address whether one in actual possession is ever
barred from bringing a quiet title action. See In re Hoopiiaina,
2006 UT 53, K 11.
7
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to quiet their title." 2000 UT App 105, % 17. While no Utah
cases have specifically adopted this rule, a number of our cases
assume that we adhere to it. For example, in Rodgers v. Hansen,
we held that claimant's quiet title action was not barred by a
limitation statute where claimant's successor "had continuous
possession of the property" and claimant filed the action shortly
after the successor's death, even though "it was known that there
was a dispute as to respective interests in the property" almost
twenty years before the quiet title action was filed. 580 P.2d
233, 235 (Utah 1978). Similarly, in Davidsen v. Salt Lake City,
we found significant the fact that claimant was "not in
possession of the land" along with other factors in ultimately
concluding that a limitations statute barred claimant's quiet
title action. 81 P.2d 374, 376-77 (Utah 1938).
Hl6 Other jurisdictions have explicitly adopted the general
rule recognized in Condor. For example, in Viersen v. Boettcher,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held "that an action to quiet title,
where the plaintiff has been in continuous possession of the
property, claiming ownership therein, can be maintained at any
time, and no statute of limitation bars [the claimant's] right to
the relief sought." 387 P.2d 133, 138 (Okla. 1963). Similarly,
in Muktarian v. Barmby, the California Supreme Court held that
while "it is ordinarily necessary to refer to the underlying
theory of relief to determine which [limitation] statute
applies," it was unnecessary in that case because "no statute of
limitations runs against a plaintiff seeking to quiet title when
he is in possession of the property" and claims ownership
thereof. 407 P.2d 659, 661 (Cal. 1965). The court in Muktarian
went on to explain the reason for this rule:
In many instances one in possession would not
know of dormant adverse claims of persons not
in possession. Morever, even if . . . the
party in possession knows of such a potential
claimant, there is no reason to put him to
the expense and inconvenience of litigation
until such a claim is pressed against him.
Id. (internal citations omitted). More recently, the California
Supreme Court affirmed this rule in Mayer v. L&B Real Estate, 185
P.3d 43, 46 (Cal. 2008) ("It long has been the law that whether a
statute of limitations bars an action to quiet title may turn on
whether the plaintiff is in undisturbed possession of the
land."). We agree with the rule followed in other jurisdictions
and hold that the statute of limitations does not bar an
individual or entity from bringing an action to quiet title to
real property when that individual or entity is (1) in actual
possession of property and (2) under a claim of ownership.
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i|l7 In this case, Bangerter has been in continuous
possession of the Property under a claim of ownership from at
least 1994 to the present. While Jarmaccc was given a sheriff's
deed to the Property in January 1998 and filed a Notice to Quit
in May 1998, it failed to pursue the Notice |to Quit or any other
eviction proceeding, and Bangerter has remained in possession of
the Property. Further, Bangerter claims both legal and equitable
ownership of the property. Specifically, shje alleges that
Jarmaccc's deed is void and that Jarmaccc is equitably estopped
from asserting any title to the Property based on payments
Jarmaccc received during Bangerter's second bankruptcy
proceeding. Given these facts, we hold that no statute of
limitations bars Bangerter from asserting an action to quiet
title in the Property because she is in actual possession of the
Property under a claim of ownership. We therefore remand to the
court of appeals to review the District Court's ruling that
Jarmaccc's sheriff's deed is void and that Jarmaccc is equitably
estopped from asserting any title to the Property.
CONCLUSION
fl8 Bangerter has been in continuous possession of the
Property under a claim of ownership from 1994 to the present and
therefore is not barred by the statute of limitations from
asserting an action to quiet title to the Property. Because we
hold that no statute of limitations applies in this case, we need
not determine whether Jarmaccc waived its statute of limitations
defense. We therefore remand to the court of appeals for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Hl9 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
Justice Wilkins, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish's
opinion.
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laintiff h a s failed to have the same made before t h e comlencement of the action and any one of the defendants shall
ave such abstract afterwards made, t h e cost of the abstract,
ith interest thereon from the time t h e same is subject to the
ispection of t h e respective parties to t h e action, must be
[lowed and taxed. Whenever such abstract is procured by the
laintiff before t h e commencement of t h e action h e must file
ith his complaint a notice that an abstract of t h e title h a s
sen made and is subject to the inspection and use of all t h e
arties to the action, designating therein where t h e abstract
ill be kept for inspection. But if t h e plaintiff h a s failed to
rocure such abstract before commencing the action, and any
sfendant shall procure the same to be made, he shall, as soon
5 he h a s directed it to be made, file a notice thereof in t h e
:tion with t h e clerk of the court, stating who is making the
ime and where it will be kept when finished. The court, or t h e
dge thereof, may direct, from time to time during the
egress of the action, who shall have custody of the abstract.
1953

S-39-49. I n t e r e s t o n a d v a n c e s t o b e allowed.
Whenever during the progress of the action for partition any
sbursement shall have been made, under the direction of the
lurt or the judge thereof, by a party thereto, interest must be
lowed thereon from the time of making t h e same.
1953
CHAPTER 4 0
QUIET TITLE
action
J-40-1
J-40-2.
S-40-2.5.
WO-3.
J-40-4.
1-40-5
1-40-6.
1-40-7
1-40-8
1-40-9
1-40-10
-40-11
-40-12
-40-13

Action to determine adverse claim to property
— Authorized.
Lis pendens.
Motions related to a notice of the pendency of
an action.
Disclaimer or default by defendant — Costs.
Termination of title pending action — Judgment — Damages.
Setoff or counterclaim for improvements made.
Right of entry pending action for purposes of
action.
Order therefor — Liability for injuries.
Mortgage not deemed a conveyance — Foreclosure necessary.
Alienation pending action not to prejudice recovery.
Actions respecting mining claims — Proof of
customs and usage admissible.
Temporary injunction in actions involving title
to mining claims.
Service of summons and conclusiveness of
judgment.
Judgment on default — Court must require
evidence — Conclusiveness of judgment.

•40.1. Action to determine adverse claim to property
.
— Authorized.
z11 action may be brought by any person against another
claims an estate or interest in real property or an interest
lni
to personal property adverse to him, for the purpose
e
termming such adverse claim
1953
^°-2- Lis p e n d e n s .
ac
tion affecting the title to, or the right of possession
r ^
Property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint
ft
swer e a ^ e r ' a n d t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t i m e o f filing h l s
en
ytir
affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or a t
intv 6 e r w a r d > m a y file f ° r record with the recorder of the
ln w
hich t h e property or some p a r t thereof is situated

78-40-4

a notice of t h e pendency of the action, containing the names of
the parties, t h e object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in t h a t county affected thereby. From t h e
time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser or
encumbrancer of the property afffected thereby be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of t h e action, and
only of its pendency against patties designated by their real
names.
1953
78-40-2.5. Motions related to a notice of the pendency
of an action.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Claimant" means a person who files a notice.
(b) "Guarantee" means an agreement by a claimant to
pay a n amount of damages:
(i) specified by the court;
(ii) suffered as a result of the maintenance of a
notice;
(iii) to a person with a n interest in t h e real property t h a t is the subject pf the notice; and
(iv) if the requirements of Subsection (6) are met.
(c) "Notice" means a notice of the pendency of a n action
filed under Section 78-40-2.1
(2) Any time after a notice h a s been recorded pursuant to
Section 78-40-2, any of the following may make a motion to t h e
court in which t h e action is penaing to release t h e notice:
(a) a party to the action; or
(b) a person with an interest in t h e real property
affected by t h e notice.
(3) A court shall order a notice released if:
(a) t h e court receives a n a t i o n to release under Subsection (2); and
(b) t h e court finds that the claimant h a s not established by a preponderance of t h e evidence t h e probable
validity of t h e real property claim that is t h e subject of the
notice.
(4) If a court releases a notice pursuant to this section, t h e
claimant m a y not record another notice with respect to t h e
same property without approvaji of the court in which t h e
action is pending.
|
(5) Upon a motion by any persoh with an interest in the real
property t h a t is t h e subject of a notice, a court may require t h e
claimant to give t h e moving partv a guarantee as a condition
of maintaining t h e notice:
(a) any time after a notice^ has been recorded, and
(b) regardless of whether the court h a s received a n
application to release under Subsection (2).
(6) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (5)
may recover an amount not to exceed the amount of t h e
guarantee upon a showing that:
(a) t h e claimant did not prevail on t h e real property
claim; and
(b) t h e person seeking t h e guarantee suffered damages
as a result of the maintenance of the notice.
(7) A court shall award costs ahd attorney fees to a prevailing party on any motion under tjiis section unless the court
finds that:
(a) t h e nonprevailing party acted with substantial justification; or
(b) other circumstances mkke the imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust.
2004
78-40-3. Disclaimer or default by defendant — Costs.
If the defendant in such action disclaims in his answer any
interest or estate in the property, or suffers judgment to be
taken against him without answeij, the plaintiff cannot recover
costs.
1953
78-40-4. Termination of title pending action — Judgment — Damages.
If the plaintiff shows a right to recover at the time the action
was commenced, but it appears tfyat his right has terminated
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during the pendency of the action, t h e verdict and judgment
must be according to t h e fact, and the plaintiff may recover
damages for withholding the property.
1953

78-40-5. Setoff or counterclaim for improvements
made.
When damages are claimed for withholding the property
recovered, upon which permanent improvements have been
made by a defendant, or those under whom he claims, holding
under color of title adversely to the claims of the plaintiff, in
good faith, the value of such improvements, except improvements made upon mining property, must be allowed as a setoff
or counterclaim against such damages.
1953

78-40-6. Right of entry pending action for purposes of
action.
The court in which an action is pending for the recovery of
real property, or for damages for an injury thereto, or to quiet
title or to determine adverse claims thereto, or a judge of such
court, may, on motion, upon notice by either party, for good
cause shown, grant an order allowing to such party the right
to enter upon the property and make survey and measurement thereof, and of any tunnels, shafts or drifts thereon for
the purpose of t h e action, even though entry for such purpose
has to be made through other lands belonging to parties to the
action.
1953

78-40-7. Order therefor — Liability for injuries.
The order m u s t describe the property, and a copy thereof
must be served on the owner or occupant, and thereupon such
party may enter upon t h e property with necessary surveyors
and assistants, and may make such survey and measurement;
but if any unnecessary injury is done to the property, he is
liable therefor.
1953

78-40-8. Mortgage not deemed a conveyance — Foreclosure necessary.
A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of the
mortgage to recover possession of the real property without a
foreclosure and sale.
1953

78-40-9. Alienation pending action not to prejudice
recovery.
An action for the recovery of real property against a person
in possession cannot be prejudiced by any alienation made by
such person, either before or after t h e commencement of the
action.
1953

78-40-10. Actions respecting mining claims — Proof of
customs and usage admissible.

any violation of an order so made, the court, or judge the:
may punish for contempt as in the cases of violation o
injunction, and may also vacate the order of postponeme
78-40-12. Service of summons and conclusivenes
judgment.
Where service of process is made upon unknown defend
by publication, the action shall proceed against such unkr
persons in the same manner as against the defendants
are named and upon whom service is made by publication
any such unknown person who has or claims to have any r
title, estate, lien or interest in the said property, which
cloud on the title thereto, adverse to the plaintiff, at the
of the commencement of the action, who has been duly se
as aforesaid, and anyone claiming under him, shall be
eluded by the judgment in such action as effectually as ]
action were brought against such person by his or her n
notwithstanding such unknown person may be under
disability.
78-40-13. Judgment on default — Court must rec
evidence — Conclusiveness of judgment.
When the summons has been served and the tim
answering has expired, the court shall proceed to hea
cause as in other cases, and shall have jurisdiction to exa
into and determine the legality of the plaintiff's title and
title and claims of all the defendants and of all unk
persons, and to that end must not enter any judgme
default against unknown defendants, but must in all
require evidence of plaintiff's title and possession and
such evidence as may be offered respecting the claims am
of any of the defendants, and must thereafter enter judg
in accordance with the evidence and the law. The judj
shall be conclusive against all the persons named i
summons and complaint who have been served and agai]
such unknown persons as stated in the complaint and
mons who have been served by publication.
CHAPTER 41
TERMINATION OF LIFE ESTATE [REPEALE]
78-41-1. Repealed.
CHAPTER 42
VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATK
[REPEALED]

In actions respecting mining claims proof must be admitted
of t h e customs, usages or regulations established and in force
in the district, bar, diggings or camp embracing such claim;
and such customs, usages or regulations, when not in conflict
with the laws of this state or of t h e United States, must govern
the decision of the action.
1953

78-42-1 to 78-42-7. Repealed.

78-40-11. Temporary injunction in actions involving
title to mining claims.
In actions involving the title to mining claims, if it is made
to appear to the satisfaction of the court that, in order that
justice may be done and the action fairly tried on its merits, it
is necessary that further development should be made, and
that the party applying has been guilty of no laches and is
acting in good faith, the court shall grant the postponement of
the trial of the action, giving the party a reasonable time in
which to prepare for trial. And in granting such postponement
the court may, in its discretion, annex as a condition thereto
an order that the party obtaining such postponement shall
not, pending the trial of the action, remove from the premises
in controversy any valuable quartz, rock, earth or ores; and for

Section
78-43-1 to 78-43-6. Repealed.
78-43-7.
Saving clause.
78-43-8.
Repealing clause.

CHAPTER 43
VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS

78-43-1 to 78-43-6. Repealed.
78-43-7. Saving clause.
The provisions of Title 78, "The Judicial Code," se1
Section 1 of this act, with respect to the organization of
the several courts therein provided for, including all
and employees thereof, shall be construed as continus
existing law, and the tenure of the justices, judges, ju
the peace, officers, and employees of each of the same,

REAL ESTATE
nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections
75-2-201 through 75-2-207;
(i) if t h e document purports to be executed p u r s u a n t to
y to be a final determination in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed pursuant to a power of
'eminent domain, the court, official body, or condemnor
gacted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the
[execution of t h e document were taken; and
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document,
Including without limitation recitals concerning mergers
or n a m e changes of organizations, are true.
) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even
igh the document purports only to release a claim or to
rey any right, title, or interest of the person executing it or
person on whose behalf it is executed.
1989
CHAPTER 5
PLATS A N D SUBDIVISIONS [REPEALED]
i-1 t o 57-5-8.

Repealed.

1991

CHAPTER 6
OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS
i

ion
kl.
^2.
*3.
*4.
^5.
^6.
-7.
-8.

Stay of execution of judgment of possession.
Claimant to commence action — Complaint — Trial
of issues.
Rights of parties — Acquiring other's interest or
holding as tenants in common.
Certain persons considered to hold under color of
title.
Settlers under state or federal law or contract
deemed occupying claimants.
Setoff against claim for improvements.
When execution on judgment of possession may
issue.
Improvements made by occupants of land granted
to state.

1-1. Stay of execution of judgment of possession.
here an occupant of real estate has color of title to t h e real
te, and in good faith h a s made valuable improvements on
real estate, and is afterwards in a proper action found not
5 the owner, no execution shall issue to put the owner in
ession of t h e real estate after the filing of a complaint as
inafter provided, until the provisions of this chapter have
L complied with.
1995

-2. Claimant to commence action — Complaint —
Trial of issues.
ich complaint must set forth the grounds on which the
adant seeks relief, stating as accurately as practicable the
e of the real estate, exclusive of the improvements thereon
e by the claimant or his grantors, and the value of such
•ovements. The issues joined thereon must be tried as in
actions, and the value of the real estate and of such
•ovements must be separately ascertained on the trial.
1953

-3. Rights of parties — Acquiring other's interest
or holding as tenants in common.
te plaintiff in the main action may thereupon pay t h e
•aised value of the improvements and take the property,
should h e fail to do so after a reasonable time, to be fixed
he court, the defendant may take the property upon
rig its value, exclusive of the improvements. If this is not
J within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the

57-7-19

parties will be held to be tenants in common of all the real
estate, including t h e improvements, each holding an interest
proportionate to t h e values ascertained on the trial.
1953

57-6-4. Certain persons considered to hold under color
of title.
(1) A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale
made by the proper person or officer has color of title within
the meaning of this chapter, whether or not the person or
officer has sufficient authority to sell, unless the want of
authority was known to the purchaser at the time of the sale.
(2) (a) Any person has color of title who has occupied a
tract of real estate by himself, or by those under whom he
claims, for the term of five years, or who has occupied it
for less time, if he, or those under whom he claims, have
at any time during the occupancy with the knowledge or
consent, express or implied, of the real owner made any
valuable improvements on the real estate, or if he or those
under whom he claims have at any time during the
occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes on the real
estate for any one year, and two years have elapsed
without a repayment by the owner, and the occupancy is
continued up to the time at which the action is brought by
which the recovery of the real estate is obtained.
(b) The person's rights shall pass to his assignees or
representatives.
(3) Nothing h> this chapter shall be construed to give
tenants color of title against their landlords or give any person
a claim under color of title to school or institutional trust lands
as defined in Subsection 53C-1-103(6).
1995

57-6-5. Settlers under state or federal law or contract
deemed occupying claimants.
When any person h a s settled upon any real estate and
occupied the same for three years under or by virtue of any law
or contract with the proper officers of the state for the
purchase thereof, or under any law of, or by virtue of any
purchase from, the United States, and shall have made
valuable improvements thereon, and shall be found not to be
the owner thereof, or not to have acquired a right to purchase
the same from t h e state or the United States, such person
shall be an occupying claimant within the meaning of this
chapter.
1953

57-6-6. Setoff against claim for improvements.
In the cases above provided for, if the occupying claimant
h a s committed any injury to the real estate by cutting timber,
or otherwise, the plaintiff may set the same off against any
claim for improvements made by the claimant.
1953

57-6-7. When execution on judgment of possession
may issue.
The plaintiff in the main action is entitled to an execution to
p u t him in possession of his property in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter, but not otherwise.
1953

57-6-8. Improvements made by occupants of land
granted to state.
Any person having improvements on any real estate
granted to the state in aid of any work of internal improvement, whose title thereto is questioned by another, may
remove such improvements without injury otherwise to such
real estate, at any time before he is evicted therefrom, or he
may claim and have the benefit of this chapter by proceeding
as herein directed.
1953
CHAPTER 7
^OWNSITES [REPEALED]
57-7-1 to 57-7-19.

Repealed.

1999

